Of course a government is going to run into problems when it comes to computer upgrades. The systems are so complex and vital, that's just a given.
So the audit released Tuesday by auditor general Carol Bellringer into the high-profile integrated case management system found all the trouble you'd expect after all the sustained controversy.
The more intriguing aspects were about how creative the government got in clinging to the idea that the $182-million upgrade for the systems used by various social programs were going well.
It's a new chapter in the same story every time governments walk into the minefield of information-technology projects. They often wait until there's a crisis brought on by delaying upgrades until the existing system is a relic. Then they rush the upgrade because the crisis is getting worse. Then they discover huge problems grafting the new bells and whistles onto the old model.
Then they pay big overtime bills and extra emergency costs to force the changes through various missed deadlines, because there's no turning back. Then they try to finesse their way through the period of confusion when the conversion is underway.
The ICM version of this never-ending story includes a twist. After the conversion created a number of problems - including a complete shutdown - that had the representative for children and youth wringing her hands and the minister on the hot seat in the legislature, they capped it off by nominating the project for a "Premier's Award for Innovation and Achievement" a few weeks ago.
As reported by Vancouver Sun colleague Rob Shaw, it wasn't actually for the project itself, which Bellringer confirmed ran well off the rails.
It was for how staff responded to all the problems listed above: "Dedicated-change teams, responsiveness, communication and staff engagement made the significant transition from old to new a success."
The audit delved into the government's own assessments of how it was doing during the conversion and discovered a gap between the descriptions and the reality. The key communication strategy on the part of government was to just explain away all the problems, rewrite the history of the conversion and retroactively adjust the facts in order to label the job a "success."
Which is how you get to the fact sheet that was issued Nov. 27, 2014, after the fourth and final phase was judged to have been completed.
"ICM had a capital budget of $182 million and the project was delivered on track, on time and on budget," says the fact sheet.
"As expected, there have been some issues and challenges during implementation, but the team has been very diligent in addressing issues as they arise and making adjustments as needed."
Those "adjustments" are one of the issues Bellringer looked into at length. One of the main reasons the project was launched was the need to replace more than 50 "aging, inflexible, legacy systems." The government hung the whole rationale on those "antiquated, fragmented, costly" systems. They were prone to failure and were considered obsolete.
With all the emphasis on how the junky old systems had to be replaced, the key measure of success would be how well the replacement went.
But Bellringer found only a third of the old systems were replaced. The project was on time and on budget only because they dramatically curtailed the work. "The scope of ICM implementation was not fully completed as initially planned," she said. "Some key functions still depend on legacy systems for full operation."
In other words, they ran out of money, so they called the job complete when they were only midway through it. Social Development Minister Michelle Stilwell suggested the findings were old news, as progress was made after it was completed and most of the recommendations are already in force. She also said some of the old systems might not need replacing after all.
The system now is better than it was. You can't spend $182 million without making some improvements.
But the real medal for innovation goes to the people who dreamed up a way to call this curtailed effort a success.
